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Abstract
To determine the threat exposure of a virtualized
environment, attack graphs generation, coupled to
a risk-based assessment can be used. The first road-
block to lift to that end is the extraction of the
topology. We will present in this paper the stategy
we intend to use to obtain a near real-time view
of the connectivity existing in a virtual infrastruc-
ture.
1 Introduction
Communication infrastructures are regularly tar-
geted by attackers willing to gain access to the
value they contain. Viable and efficient security su-
pervision mechanisms are hence of the utmost im-
portance for companies in this digital era, in order
to trigger a swift remediation in case of intrusion
detection. To address this issue, approaches such as
attack graphs generation, coupled to a risk-based
assessment have been used to provide an insight
into a system’s threat exposure [10, 12, 14]. Af-
ter identification and evaluation of existing attack
paths allowing a compromise of the system, mea-
sures can be deployed for mitigation. However, as
corrective actions are often constrained by opera-
tional requirements that can delay their enforce-
ment, (e.g. need to ensure a continuity of service,
cost of measures to deploy...), a balance has to be
found with the security policy enforced.
Such approaches have yet to be applied to a vir-
tualized context, as these environments, besides
sparking a growing interest, also give rise to new
challenges. On one hand, the very elasticity and
dynamism that draw to the Cloud leads to more
volatile customers’ infrastructures and more mo-
bile virtual components. Furthermore, new attack
scenarios have to be considered since logical bound-
aries between a hypervisor and its virtual machines
(VMs) can be circumvented by a malicious VM to
access the host system or other co-located instances
[2, 1]. On the other hand, virtualized environments
abide by security policies that originate from at
least two governances: the one of the provider, and
the one of the tenants (customers sharing the same
hardware in a cloud environment). Taking these
considerations into account, several steps are in-
volved in the realization of a dynamic risk manage-
ment solution for the Cloud:
• Extracting the topology: knowledge gained
concerning connectivity and reachability
within the tenants’ infrastructure and with
the provider system is a basis for an accurate
view of the assets and their interconnected-
ness;
• Translating that topology into an attack graph
allows for the identification of feasible attack
paths in the infrastructure;
• Determining the risk, based on the attack
graph obtained, to guide the administrators in
the decision process;
• Activating the proper response (based on pre-
vious established order) in adequation not only
with the security policy of the provider, but
also the one of the related tenant and poten-
tially its co-located neighbours.
In the remainder of this article, we elaborate
more on the first item of the solution: the extrac-
tion of the topology. The goal is to present the
strategy we intend to use to obtain a near real-time
view of the connectivity existing in the virtual in-
frastructure.
2 Motivating Use Case
2.1 Community Cloud of Telecommuni-
cation Providers
The use case considered stems from our research
environment, i.e. a company providing services es-
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sentially to telecommunication providers, and com-
bining cloud, SDN (Software-Defined Networking)
and NFV (Network Functions Virtualization) solu-
tions. NFV enables a ”softwarization” of the net-
work: networking functions previously bound to
purposed-built hardware (firewalls, routers, load-
balancers, encryption...) can now be implemented
as software and supported by off-the-shelf equip-
ments. Additionally, combined with cloud comput-
ing and SDN for dynamic network configuration,
these functions can be deployed into virtual ma-
chines, allowing the telecommunication providers
to benefit from scalability, better load manage-
ment, economies of scale and faster innovation. Be-
cause, to some extent, telecommunication providers
depend on analogous functionalities to provide
their services, and share similar concerns regarding
security and compliance, they can be aggregated
into a community cloud [9]. We thus design a use
case based on a company operating a community
cloud, and hosting virtualized network functions for
its tenants, i.e telecommunication providers. The
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Figure 1: Example Architecture
cloud provider’s infrastructure consists of a cloud
management system, coupled with a SDN con-
troller and Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI)
mechanisms. Figure 1 shows an example of the
architecture, with tenants leveraging the physical
infrastructure of the cloud provider to supply their
services.
2.2 A Hierarchy of Dynamics
Given the context previously introduced, we can
assume that in such clouds, a rough uniformity
can be deduced regarding the characteristics of the
tenants’ infrastructures and a first assumption can
be made regarding the different levels of dynam-
icity in the considered infrastructure. Indeed, if
we consider the tenants to be telecommunication
providers, their architectures can be considered rel-
atively stable from the standpoint of the network
connectivity. Being managed by telecommunica-
tion companies to provide services to their cus-
tomers, major network changes are first tested for a
proper integration with production environment to
avoid loss of service. On the other hand, the trans-
fer of VMs from one physical machine to another,
their addition, deletion or extinction occur at a
much faster rate, according to the cloud provider’s
and tenants’ operational needs, as well as poten-
tial SLAs negotiated between the parties. Indeed,
when facing peak demands, telecom providers may
need to spawn new instances to host their network
functions, instances that would be terminated as
the trafic drops down. We hence hypothesize a hi-
erarchy of dynamics, the rate of changes in network
configuration being lower than the one in the loca-
tion and state of the VMs. These are properties
that will be considered for an optimisation of the
topology generation, by an identification of opera-
tions resulting in a complete re-computation of the
topology and those requiring only a slight update.
2.3 Challenges to Topology Extraction
Besides the dynamic nature of the Cloud, lack
of knowledge regarding tenants’ custom configura-
tions can also hinder the topology acquisition. In-
deed, the use of a cloud management system make
tenants’ infrastructure details readily available, ex-
actly as they are provisioned by the tenants on the
provider’s platform; yet, no hypothesis can be made
upon connectivity restrictions implemented by the
tenants within their infrastructures, e.g. custom
firewall instanciation within a VM. Furthermore,
the combination of Cloud and SDN poses an addi-
tional challenge, since an essential property of SDN
is enabling the administrators to deploy applica-
tions on the SDN controller. Those applications
can then, according to the programmed logic, re-
actively modify the flow rules on the switches and
directly influence the topology. They can add or
remove links, without providing any feedback to
the Cloud Management System, leading to an in-
consistent state of the topology processed via that
source. We thus need to closely monitor changes
introduced by SDN applications on the topology.
2
3 An Approach for Topology Ex-
traction in the Cloud
3.1 Background
The topology can be retrieved by following either
a static or a dynamic approach. Madi and al. [8]
extracted data from a cloud management system,
a SDN controller and virtual switches in order to
check (among other things) whether the topology
view in the cloud management system matches the
actual implementation. However, they performed
their analysis on a snapshot of the infrastructure
and did not address dynamic changes. Probst
[13] investigated the correct placement of security
mechanisms in virtual infrastructures, by auditing
a clone of the targeted virtual environment. Copy-
ing the initial network configuration and virtual
firewalls, and replacing the virtual machines by
lighter, custom versions allowed to rebuild the cus-
tomer’s infrastructure, while maintaining the confi-
dentiality of her data. In both research, the authors
considered a frozen picture of the virtual infrastruc-
ture, in which a change called for a re-acquisition
and re-processing of the data. To detect isolation
failure in virtualized environments, Bleikertz and
al. [6] performed a topology discovery phase, and a
translation of the retrieved data into a graph. By
using hypervisors’ APIs, they aggregated knowl-
edge regarding the configuration of the virtual envi-
ronment: physical machine, virtual machine, stor-
age and network details. Rather than periodically
refreshing the entire configuration details, they ad-
dressed the dynamic nature of that environment [7],
by monitoring change events in the infrastructure
to update specific portions of the graph. We also in-
tend to monitor change events, but we go a little bit
further by hypothesizing that some changes occur
more frequently than others. That consideration
can help the design of an efficient data processing
strategy.
3.2 Defining Connectivity in a Virtual-
ized Environment
Traditionally, the notion of connectivity in a
telecommunication context is associated with the
ability of a particular machine (either an end-
point or intermediary equipment) to reach another
through the network. This is often referred to as
network connectivity. However, as evoked in the
introduction, cloud computing allows for the re-
placement of physical boundaries by logical ones,
which can be by-passed, thus exposing the resident
machines to intruders. Indeed, attacks can be per-
formed to initiate VM-to-hypervisor or VM-to-VM
compromise [11], resulting in possible information
extraction from the targeted tenant, or full control
over the virtualization layer. As a consequence,
aside from the network connectivity, a local connec-
tivity also exists, representing the relationship be-
tween hypervisors and their hosted VMs. We can
identify hypervisors and virtual machines as two
distinct types of nodes. The expression of the var-
ious components connectedness can hence be rep-
resented as follows:
• A network connectivity between hypervisors;
• A network connectivity between virtual ma-
chines instances;
• A local connectivity between virtual ma-
chines’instances;
• A local connectivity between the hypervisor
and its virtual machines’ instances.
3.3 Preliminary Experimentation
In this preliminary experimentation, our objective
was to retrieve the local and network dependen-
cies. A simple architecture of three servers was
used for tests. Built upon KVM [3] as the hy-
pervisor techonology, Openstack [5] as the Cloud
Management System and Opendaylight [4] as the
SDN controller, one server was dedicated to Open-
stack control functions, the SDN controller and
the networking service, while the other two were
used for VM hosting. Openstack and Openday-
light were chosen due to their widespread use in
the industry and the continuous efforts made to
integrate these platforms. We considered the rep-
resentation of information extracted from Neutron
and Nova databases, respectively Openstack’s net-
working and compute services. Together they store
knowledge about the virtual networks, the virtual
machines and hypervisors involved, as well as the
security rules applied to the guest machines (Open-
stack’s firewall rules). Objects in the local connec-
tivity are hypervisors and VMs. On the other hand,
the network connectivity is comprised of VMs, vir-
tual networks, virtual routers and virtual security
groups as objects. As an initialization phase, for
each hypervisor in Openstack database, we asso-
ciate its running VMs (local connectivity). Each
VM is linked to its security groups and directly
connected networks, each network potentially hav-
ing an entry for routers connected to it. That ini-
tialization allows to have a first snapshot of the
state of the infrastructure. Each change of VM or
network state creates a notification that is queued
in Openstack messaging service for processing; in
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order to dynamically update the state of our ob-
jects, we intercept and process these events. In
our first approach we registered the resulting topol-
ogy (local and network) into a single formatted file
that had to be parsed and updated upon any given
event. However, as described in the use case, due
to our context, the virtual networks have a slower
evolution than the local connectivity. Events such
as VM migration or instanciation do not affect the
structure of the network designed by the tenants.
Considering the addition of physical nodes by the
providers, the same can be assumed for the phys-
ical network, at least the segments connecting the
nodes. Due to this finding, we splitted the file in
two, one for each type of connectivity, and reduced
the computation overhead when a modification oc-
curs depending on its impacts: either on local or
on network connectivity.
4 Conclusion
In this article, we presented our early thoughts re-
garding the extraction of the topology in a virtu-
alized environment. An experimental context has
been introduced. Dynamic aspects, which repre-
sent a strong suit of the Cloud, but also the main
source of concern for an acquisition of a complete
view of the tenants’ infrastructures, have been cat-
egorized according to change rates. This represents
the first step in the elaboration of a general solution
for dynamic risk management applied to modern
communication infrastructures. From that prelim-
inary study emerged a physical and a virtual strata,
which we intend to leverage for an optimized topol-
ogy extraction and afterwards a multi-layer attack
graphs generation. The ultimate intent being to
guide cloud providers and tenants in their secu-
rity decision process, by prioritizing attack paths
discovered in the system and applying the proper
security policy.
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